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Macroeconomics is evolving from the study of aggregate dynamics to the study of the dynamics of
the entire equilibrium distribution of allocations across individual economic actors. This article reviews
the quantitative macroeconomic literature that focuses on household heterogeneity, with a special emphasis
on the "standard" incomplete markets model. We organize the vast literature according to three themes
that are central to understanding how inequality matters for macroeconomics. First, what are the most
important sources of individual risk and cross-sectional heterogeneity? Second, what are individuals'
key channels of insurance? Third, how does idiosyncratic risk interact with aggregate risk?
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The embrace of heterogeneity by macroeconomists is rooted in the \rational expectations rev-
olution." Until the 1970s, the ¯eld of macroeconomics concentrated on estimating systems of
ad hoc aggregate relationships (\Cowles macroeconometrics") and largely abstracted from in-
dividual behavior and di®erences across economic agents. Lucas, Sargent, and Wallace, among
others, transformed the agenda in macroeconomics, shifting the focus to dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models grounded in optimal individual decision making. However, the ¯rst
generation of quantitative macroeconomic models, which followed the in°uential work of Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982), was built on the representative agent paradigm. The most important
reason for this choice was that economists lacked the tools to solve dynamic models with het-
erogeneous agents and incomplete markets. In addition, it was not obvious that incorporating
household or ¯rm heterogeneity was of ¯rst-order importance for understanding the business
cycle dynamics of aggregate quantities and prices, or long-run economic growth.
Over the last two decades, faster computers and improvements in numerical methods have
made it possible to study rich heterogeneous agent models. In addition, microeconometric work
in labor economics and industrial organization has revealed enormous cross-sectional dispersion
and individual volatility for workers and ¯rms. As Heckman (2001, p. 256) puts it: \The most
important discovery was the evidence on the pervasiveness of heterogeneity and diversity in
economic life." Macroeconomists reached several conclusions about the importance of including
household heterogeneity in their models. These insights cast serious doubts on the use of the
representative-agent abstraction when studying macroeconomics.
First, heterogeneity a®ects both the levels and dynamics of aggregate equilibrium quantities
and prices. For instance, idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk implies a precautionary motive
for saving that increases aggregate wealth and reduces the equilibrium interest rate (Huggett
1993). Heathcote (2005) ¯nds that changes in the timing of taxes that would be neutral in a
representative agent model (Ricardian equivalence) turn out to have large real e®ects in a model
with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. As a ¯nal example, in an environment with
endogenous labor supply, changes in the magnitude and insurability of idiosyncratic risk a®ect
aggregate labor productivity (Heathcote et al. 2008a).
Second, introducing heterogeneity can change the answer to welfare questions. Lucas (1987)
showed that for standard preferences, aggregate °uctuations have a very small impact on the
1welfare of a representative consumer. At face value, the Lucas calculation suggested that
surprisingly little was at stake in the traditional macroeconomic topics of business cycles and
stabilization policy. One reason such a conclusion seemed premature is that economies with
incomplete markets present a natural environment in which aggregate °uctuations can have
asymmetric welfare e®ects across heterogeneous agents. In Storesletten et al. (2001), for
example, liquidity constrained households are particularly hard hit by aggregate productivity
shocks. Moreover, the average cross-sectional welfare cost of aggregate °uctuations can be
much larger than the cost for a hypothetical representative agent.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, many macro questions of great relevance simply can
not be addressed without allowing for at least some heterogeneity. For example, to study social
security requires a model in which agents di®er by age. Auerbach and Kotliko®'s (1987) book
was one of the ¯rst quantitative applications of the overlapping generations framework to study
¯scal and social security policy and demographic change. One of the key macroeconomic trends
of the recent past is the dramatic widening of the wage structure in the United States (US,
hereafter) over the period 1975{1995. Average real wages for men barely changed, but wage
dispersion within and between education groups increased dramatically. These trends and their
implications for policy and welfare can only be explored within heterogeneous agent models of
the macroeconomy (e.g., Heathcote et al. 2008b; Krueger and Perri 2006).
More broadly, macroeconomics is expanding from the study of how average values for the in-
puts (capital and labor) and outputs (consumption) of production are determined in equilibrium
to the study of how the entire distribution of these variables across households is determined.
This expansion is crucial for policy analysis, for two reasons. First, volatility at the level of
individual workers and ¯rms is orders of magnitude larger than aggregate volatility. Thus, the
welfare implications of policies that redistribute across agents are potentially much larger than
the implications of policies aimed at stabilizing the aggregates. Second, the evaluation of large-
scale government programs (e.g., social insurance, tuition subsidies) requires models that take
into account both general equilibrium e®ects and the heterogeneous impact of policies across
the population (Heckman 2001).
The standard incomplete markets model Currently, the main workhorse for studying
heterogeneity (across people) in macroeconomics is what we will call the \standard incomplete
markets" (SIM) model. Our article is centered on this framework, which we present in detail
2in Section 2. In the SIM model, a large number of agents draw idiosyncratic realizations for
productivity, and make independent choices for consumption, savings, and, in some versions,
labor supply. In aggregate, their choices determine the total amount of capital and e®ective
labor available for production and, thus, equilibrium prices.
This framework was a natural starting point for introducing heterogeneity into macroe-
conomics, from both a micro and a macro perspective. On the one hand, it embedded the
familiar income °uctuations problem at the heart of Friedman's permanent income hypothesis
in a multiple agent, general equilibrium framework. On the other, it ¯ts well with the stochastic
growth model that dominates the business cycle literature: agents maximize expected lifetime
utility in response to exogenous shocks to productivity by adjusting consumption, hours, and
capital accumulation, the only di®erence being that the SIM model incorporates shocks at the
individual level instead of (or in addition to) the aggregate level.
Over the years, this baseline SIM framework was extended in several directions, which we
discuss in detail in our article. All these variants share two common characteristics. First, they
feature imperfect insurance. Second, they incorporate the risk-sharing mechanisms observed
in actual economies. An alternative to the ¯rst feature is to introduce heterogeneity while
maintaining perfect insurance. An alternative to the second is to look for allocations that
maximize risk sharing subject to fundamental informational or enforcement frictions.
Heterogeneity with complete markets The smallest possible deviation from the repre-
sentative agent framework is to model heterogeneity in an environment with complete markets.
If, in addition, preferences are homothetic, then some sources of heterogeneity become irrele-
vant. More precisely, even though agents may di®er by initial tastes, skills, or wealth, and are
subject to idiosyncratic (but insurable) shocks, the economy aggregates in the sense that macro
aggregates do not depend on the wealth distribution.1 It is important to note, however, that
the representative agent that emerges in aggregation need not share the utility function of the
agents in the original heterogeneous agents economy. A well-known example is the indivisible
labor economies of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), where there is no connection between
the aggregate and individual labor supply elasticities.2
1Chatterjee (1994) explores the dynamics of wealth inequality in a model with common preferences but
with initial wealth dispersion. Caselli and Ventura (2000) add heterogeneity in initial tastes and skills, and
characterize the joint evolution of distributions and averages for consumption, income, and wealth.
2Maliar and Maliar (2003) is another example. They extend the Chatterjee environment to allow for id-
3Relying on the assumption of complete markets is unattractive for a number of reasons.
To many economists, market completeness seems implausible a priori as a literal description
of the world. From an empirical standpoint, the assumption of complete markets is routinely
rejected at di®erent levels. First, there is evidence that changes in earnings pass through to
consumption (e.g., Attanasio and Davis 1996). Second, when agents have identical preferences,
complete markets imply that there should be no consumption mobility. There is, however,
evidence of such mobility (see Fisher and Johnson 2006, for the US; Jappelli and Pistaferri
2006, for Italy). As Lucas (1992) puts it, \If the children of Noah had been able and willing
to pool risks, Arrow-Debreu style, among themselves and their descendants, then the vast
inequality we see today, within and across societies, would not exist." Restricting attention to
models where the initial ranking of individuals is preserved forever would be a major limitation
for a research program that aims at understanding the dynamics of inequality.
Modeling market incompleteness Abandoning the complete markets benchmark, how-
ever, raises a fundamental question. How should market incompleteness be modeled? The SIM
approach is to simply model the markets, institutions, and arrangements that are observed in
actual economies. The main virtue of this \model what you can see" approach is that it is easy
to map model allocations into empirical counterparts, because the decentralized competitive
equilibrium is characterized directly. As a result, it is straightforward to enrich the model in
various dimensions to tailor it to speci¯c applications. The main drawback of the approach is
that it is unclear why markets are incomplete in the ¯rst place. Why can agents not ¯nd better
ways to insure each other, in the spirit of Coase?
The other view is that the scope for risk sharing should be derived endogenously, subject to
the deep frictions that prevent full insurance. The \model what you can microfound" literature
has focused on information frictions (providing insurance to an agent with unobservable type or
action, as in Attanasio and Pavoni 2008) and enforcement frictions (providing insurance to an
agent who can walk away from contracts, as in Krueger and Perri 2006). In these models, risk
sharing responds to changes in the environment, which is appealing since policyexperiments
are less vulnerable to a version of the Lucas critique. In particular, the endogenous incomplete
markets approach explicitly recognizes that changes in public insurance programs are likely to
iosyncratic but insurable productivity shocks, and show that aggregate dynamics correspond to those of a
representative agent economy subject to \aggregate shocks" which are a function of higher moments of the
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
4change incentives for private insurance provision.3 However, these models have an important
limitation. They often imply substantial state-contingent transfers between agents for which
there is no obvious empirical counterpart.
We conclude this discussion by noting that the \model what you can see" and \model what
you can microfound" approaches can be combined. For example, in Section 4 we will discuss a
class of models in which the set of assets traded is speci¯ed exogenously, but borrowing costs
are determined endogenously, as a function of default incentives (e.g., Chatterjee et al. 2007).
Arguably, this approach combines the best of both worlds: the greater realism of the SIM
approach, and the trade-o® between providing risk sharing while preserving incentives from the
endogenous incompleteness approach.
Three themes The ¯rst generation of SIM models allowed for only a narrow set of sources
of heterogeneity, and a limited number of avenues for partially insuring idiosyncratic risk.
Agents were ex ante identical and ex post heterogeneous only because of exogenous shocks
to income. Risk-free bonds were the only avenue of insurance. Aggregate shocks were either
entirely absent or limited to some special cases that preserved tractability. Fortunately, the
basic SIM framework turned out to be su±ciently tractable to incorporate (i) additional sources
of risk, (ii) more channels of insurance, and (iii) aggregate risk. The three main themes of this
article illustrate how the literature is developing along these three dimensions.
Our ¯rst theme (Section 3) centers on the sources of heterogeneity and inequality. At a broad
level, individuals di®er with respect to initial innate characteristics (e.g., earning ability, health
status, and preferences), and experience di®erent sequences of shocks during their lifetimes.
For policy design, it is paramount to understand what is the importance of initial endowments
relative to subsequent shocks in determining overall inequality. In addition, it is important to
recognize that, among what economists measure as shocks, there may be anticipated changes
for which individuals were prepared. Finally, a key decision is how deep to dig in microfounding
individual income °uctuations. The early literature treated them as pure endowment shocks,
but for some questions it is important to recognize that earnings have an endogenous component
re°ecting choices about labor supply, human capital accumulation, and job search behavior.
Our second theme (Section 4) centers on assessing individuals' key channels of insurance.
3For example, Attanasio and R¶ ³os-Rull (2000) illustrate that an increase in government-provided insurance,
though a safety net, will crowd out within-family insurance and may lower agents' overall ability to smooth
consumption.
5In addition to risk-free debt, households can invest in a range of alternative assets to hedge
various risks, and can buy explicit insurance against others. The option to declare bankruptcy
introduces an additional element of state contingency in ¯nancial markets. While the ¯ction
of the in¯nitely lived \bachelor household" has o®ered many valuable insights, explicitly mod-
eling the family allows one to incorporate many important avenues of insurance: pooling of
imperfectly correlated individual risk within the household, opportunities for time reallocation
in response to shocks, and inter vivos transfers and bequests. Finally, the government o®ers
additional risk sharing via redistributive taxation and various social insurance programs. It is
obviously important to understand the relative importance of di®erent channels of insurance,
and the extent to which they substitute or complement each other.
Our third theme (Section 5) is the interaction between idiosyncratic risk and aggregate dy-
namics. A number of papers suggest that changes in the size of idiosyncratic uncertainty can
have large e®ects on aggregate prices, quantities, and productivity, re°ecting the way house-
holds' saving and labor supply decisions respond to such changes. At the same time, a range
of classical topics in macroeconomics, including the equity premium puzzle, the welfare cost of
business cycles, and the optimal design of ¯scal stabilization policies, have been reexamined in
models that feature idiosyncratic risk in addition to aggregate °uctuations. Valuable progress
is being made toward understanding the conditions on the interaction between idiosyncratic
and aggregate risk under which heterogeneity changes the implications of theory for these is-
sues. Finally, macroeconomists are beginning to explore common sources for both aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
2 The standard incomplete markets model
This section presents, mostly verbally, the structure of the standard incomplete markets (SIM)
model and some of its key properties. For a more technical description of the environment and
a de¯nition of equilibrium, we refer the reader to R¶ ³os-Rull (1995), Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004), and Krusell and Smith (2006).
The income °uctuation problem The main building block of the model is the so-called
income °uctuation problem, the problem of characterizing the optimal consumption sequence
for a household facing stochastic income °uctuations. The typical environment is as follows.
6Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;:::. An in¯nitely lived household with discount factor
¯ < 1 and time-separable preferences derives utility from streams of consumption fctg
1
t=0.
Period utility, u(ct); is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and di®erentiable. The household
faces a stochastic income endowment, yt; with bounded support. There are no state-contingent
securities to insure idiosyncratic endowment risk, only a risk-free asset, at; which yields a
constant gross interest rate R. The household can save and can borrow up to some exogenous
limit (which could be zero), but no default is allowed.
In order to smooth consumption, the household \self-insures" by accumulating and decumu-
lating assets. As in Friedman's permanent income hypothesis, consumption responds strongly
to permanent earnings shocks but very little to transitory ones. We will return to the important
question of how e®ectively the household can smooth consumption. The notion of precaution-
ary savings distinguishes this class of models from the strict version of the permanent income
hypothesis, where agents have quadratic utility and face no debt limit, except for a no{Ponzi
game condition. Precautionary saving describes saving undertaken to build a bu®er against the
risk of future endowment drops.4
There are, unfortunately, few general results that apply to this class of problems. One im-
portant implication of the precautionary motive is that if ¯R ¸ 1, then there is no upper bound
to households' optimal asset accumulation.5 Additional conditions are required to guarantee
that wealth is bounded when ¯R < 1. Schechtman and Escudero (1977) prove that decreasing
absolute risk aversion is su±cient in the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) case.
Intuitively, one needs the precautionary motive to weaken as individual assets grow, i.e., agents
must become less and less concerned about income uncertainty as they get rich. Huggett (1993)
generalizes this argument to a setting where agents have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility and their labor income follows a two-state Markov chain.6
4Precautionary savings is de¯ned as the increase in agents' accumulated wealth that would obtain when
switching from a deterministic income path to a stochastic income process. The early literature, summarized
in Kimball (1990), argued that the precautionary saving motive is active if the third derivative of the period
utility function is positive (\prudence"). However, precautionary saving arises even without a positive third
derivative, as long as households are risk-averse and face a borrowing limit that can bind due to risk.
5The result was proved in a setting without borrowing by Schechtman (1976) for the case where labor income
is i.i.d., and by Bewley (1977) for any stationary process. Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) generalize it for any
stochastic process, and any arbitrary borrowing limit|as long as agents repay with probability one.
6The only additional condition needed is the monotonicity of the Markov process, namely, that if the state
at date t is good, then the lottery for date t + 1 is better, in terms of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance, than it
would have been had the state been bad at date t. Any income process with positive autocorrelation delivers
this property.
7Equilibrium with many agents The next step in the analysis of the model is to char-
acterize the behavior of an economy populated by a continuum of households facing indepen-
dent uninsurable °uctuations in their endowments. In the benchmark model, aggregates are
constant|we defer the analysis of aggregate risk to Section 5. Households have identical pref-
erences. They can turn a unit of their endowment into a unit of the consumption good (the
numeraire), or trade it in the asset market in exchange for a promise of R units of consumption
next period|a one-period bond contract.
Characterizing a steady state in this economy means ¯nding (i) a stationary distribution
for household wealth, where wealth dispersion re°ects di®erent histories for the endowment
shock, and (ii) an interest rate R¤ that clears the asset market by equating net aggregate asset
demand to net asset supply, as in a standard Lucas (1978) tree economy. Net aggregate demand
is obtained by integrating all the (positive and negative) wealth holdings of households with
respect to the stationary distribution.
Early work by Laitner (1979) and Bewley (1983) proves existence of an equilibrium where
the net interest rate (R¤ ¡ 1) is strictly below the discount rate (1=¯ ¡ 1):7 As discussed above,
households save more than under complete markets for precautionary motives. This pushes the
interest rate below the complete markets level (i.e., the discount rate). In turn, it is precisely
a low interest rate that limits households' desire for saving and prevents the aggregate demand
for assets from growing without bound.8
In order to guarantee uniqueness of the steady-state wealth distribution, for a given interest
rate, the economy must satisfy the \monotone mixing condition," which guarantees su±cient
upward and downward social mobility. Ruling out multiple invariant distributions is necessary
to ensure continuity of the net aggregate demand function with respect to the interest rate,
hence existence of an equilibrium.9
With complete markets, the wealth distribution is indeterminate, even though the steady-
state interest rate and capital stock are unique. In contrast, under the conditions discussed
above, the SIM model has a unique invariant cross-sectional distribution, featuring mobility
7This early work by Bewley led Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) to adopt the term \Bewley models." We chose
to use the expression \standard incomplete markets models" because our review covers a large and expanding
literature that builds on, but goes far beyond, Bewley's original contributions.
8See Huggett and Ospina (2001) and Flod¶ en (2008) for further discussion of aggregate savings in general
equilibrium.
9However, even if there is a unique wealth distribution for any given interest rate, it is di±cult to prove that
net asset demand is monotone with respect to R; which would guarantee equilibrium uniqueness.
8of individuals across income, consumption, and wealth classes. Such sharp predictions for the
distribution of allocations make SIM an attractive and natural framework for studying the
determinants and dynamics of inequality.
Extending the benchmark model The benchmark model has been extended in a num-
ber of important directions. Aiyagari (1994) embedded the model in a neoclassical production
economy, with a representative ¯rm operating a constant returns to scale technology using
physical capital and e±ciency units of labor in the production of the ¯nal (consumption and
investment) good. By assuming a closed economy, so that aggregate investment equals aggre-
gate saving, Aiyagari could pin down the capital stock and the equilibrium interest rate.
A key extension, in terms of adding realism, was to add a life cycle dimension to the SIM
framework (Imrohoroglu et al. 1995; R¶ ³os-Rull 1995; Huggett 1996).10 The main advantage
of these life cycle models is that they can be tailored to capture salient features of the data,
such as an increasing age productivity pro¯le inducing life cycle dynamics in labor supply,
consumption, and wealth; a retirement period that requires the accumulation of retirement
saving; a nontrivial demographic structure; and so on.
Finally, while much of the work on heterogeneity in macroeconomics has focused on steady-
state analysis, many macroeconomic questions require the analysis of aggregate dynamics.
Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) showed how to handle a deterministic transition in an overlap-
ping generations setting, and their methodology of iterating on the entire path of prices has
proven useful in more general SIM settings.11 In an important paper, Krusell and Smith (1998)
provided a methodology for analyzing fully °edged SIM models with aggregate shocks. We
return to this in Section 5.
Quantitative analysis and calibration The SIM model has become a workhorse of
quantitative macroeconomics. Because it combines an explicit micro model of heterogeneous
households' behavior with a full-blown equilibrium macro model, both micro data on individual
allocations (e.g., earnings, wealth, consumption, and hours worked) and aggregate data from
10These life-cycle versions of the SIM model owe an intellectual debt to Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) who
developed a detailed overlapping generations model of the US economy and used it for quantitative analysis
(see also Hubbard and Judd, 1986, for an early contribution). These early models, however, did not incorporate
uninsurable risk.
11One example of such application is the analysis of demographic transitions in the life-cycle version of the
SIM model (see e.g. Krueger and Ludwig, 2007).
9national accounts are generally used to discipline its parameterization.
A common strategy for parameterization is a mix of \external calibration" using existing
parameter estimates (e.g., for preference parameters), and \internal calibration/estimation"
where one minimizes the distance between equilibrium moments and their data counterparts,
in the spirit of formal structural estimation. Often, the number of target moments is equal to
the number of estimated parameters. As argued by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) this
exact identi¯cation strategy allows for a clear separation between what the model is restricted
to match and what it is designed to explain.12 Browning et al. (1999) discuss some of the
di±culties that arise in parameterizing macro models using micro data.
The °exibility of the SIM framework, together with the availability of microeconomic
datasets on household behavior and advances in computer power, have allowed model builders
to introduce and carefully parameterize more and more sources of heterogeneity, risk, and
uncertainty. Section 3 is devoted to this topic.
E±ciency and constrained e±ciency How close do agents come to achieving perfect
risk sharing in this class of incomplete markets economies? Levine and Zame (2002) show that,
with stationary idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks, as agents become increasingly patient,
the welfare losses from market incompleteness vanish. Intuitively, as ¯ ! 1, the net equilibrium
interest rate r¤ ! 0, and the natural borrowing limit becomes arbitrarily loose. This allows
agents to smooth income shocks arbitrarily well.
A related question is whether there exists a set of \deep" constraints on the information
or enforcement structure of the environment such that constrained e±cient allocations can be
decentralized with a risk-free asset, but no state-contingent claims. A positive answer to this
question would go a long way toward bridging the gap between the two approaches to market
incompleteness (\model what you can see" versus \model what you can microfound") discussed
in the Introduction.
Allen (1985) makes some important progress in this respect. He studies Pareto e±cient
allocations in a two-period model with a pair of information frictions: risk-averse agents can
12The addition of more moments, if the model is not grossly misspeci¯ed, provides extra information on
parameter values. However, with more moments than parameters, the issue of how to weight each of the
moments arises. For example, the optimal weighting matrix does not perform well in small samples. The
exactly identi¯ed strategy amounts to a weighting matrix that sets positive and equal weight only on certain
moments, based on the investigator's prior about the \¯rst-order" dimensions of the data that the model should
¯t.
10hide their random labor endowment from the planner, and they can also secretly borrow and
save. Because they can borrow and lend without being monitored, regardless of the true history,
agents always report to the planner the endowment state associated to the largest transfer.
As a result, the planner ¯nds it e±cient to make the same, history-independent transfer to
all individuals at time zero, and to let them do all intertemporal smoothing on their own.
It is easy to see that the resulting consumption allocations can be decentralized through a
competitive asset market in which agents with the same initial wealth simply trade a risk-free
bond. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) generalize this result to a multiperiod setting, with i.i.d.
labor endowment shocks.13
Davila et al. (2005) ask how di®erent allocations would look in a SIM world if a utilitarian
planner could dictate agents' consumption and savings decisions, while respecting each individ-
ual's budget constraint. They ¯nd, surprisingly, that the decentralized competitive equilibrium
has too little accumulation of capital in aggregate relative to what the planner would choose.
The intuition is that the planner (and, ex ante, individual agents) would prefer higher wages
and a lower interest rate, in order to induce a redistribution of resources from the capital-
income-dependent rich to the labor-income-dependent poor.
3 Sources of heterogeneity
At a broad level, individuals di®er in terms of both initial \innate" characteristics and the
subsequent shocks they receive over the life cycle. Moreover, these exogenous di®erences lead
to heterogeneity in endogenous choices (e.g., labor supply, human capital accumulation, job
search), which either amplify or shrink inequality in economic outcomes.
This view of inequality as a mix of innate characteristics, uninsurable shocks, and endoge-
nous choices raises three important and interrelated questions. First, what is the relative
importance of initial endowments as compared to subsequent shocks in determining overall
dispersion in economic outcomes? Second, what fraction of changes in inequality over time is
due to genuine shocks as opposed to anticipated events for which the individual is prepared?
Third, in building microfoundations for a model of individual heterogeneity, where do we draw
13Abraham and Pavoni (forthcoming) qualify this result: if the hidden information problem is about an action
(e.g., unobservable e®ort) instead of a type (e.g., unobservable endowment), then Pareto e±cient allocations are
welfare-improving relative to self-insurance. In this sense, the decentralization based only on a risk-free bond is
not robust.
11the line between exogenous factors beyond the individual's control and rational choices?
We start addressing these questions in the context of earnings and consumption inequality,
which is the traditional focus of most of the literature. Next, we examine other sources of
inequality which have recently attracted a lot of attention: health shocks, and family shocks.
3.1 Earnings
3.1.1 Shocks versus initial conditions in earnings dynamics
Shocks The only source of heterogeneity in the early quantitative heterogeneous agents, in-
complete markets economies (Imrohoroglu 1989; Huggett 1993; Aiyagari 1994) was exogenous
uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings shocks. The ex post heterogeneity in shock histories across
ex ante identical individuals translates into consumption and wealth di®erentials through saving
decisions.14
This approach places the search for the correct statistical model of earnings shocks at the
center of the research agenda. Labor economics has a long tradition of studying income dy-
namics from longitudinal micro data, such as the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The leading view, based on more than two decades of empirical studies, is that a stochastic
process comprising a very persistent autoregressive component and a transitory (or low-order
moving average) component accurately describes the data (Lillard and Willis 1978; MaCurdy
1982; Abowd and Card 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri 2004). Recently, macroeconomists have
begun to borrow methods developed by this literature to parameterize idiosyncratic earnings
risk in their models. A few lessons have been learned.
First, the evidence on rising US earnings dispersion over the last thirty years suggests the
existence of substantial time variability in the parameters of the individual earnings process
(Gottschalk and Mo±tt 1994). This time variability is absolutely central in the literature trying
to account for the dynamics of consumption inequality (for the US, see Krueger and Perri 2006,
Heathcote et al. 2008b; for the UK, see Blundell and Preston 1998).
Second, in a plausibly calibrated SIM model, transitory earnings shocks are easily smoothed
through borrowing and saving, and have a negligible impact on consumption inequality. How-
ever, omitting transitory shocks may lead to a severe underestimation of the persistence of the
14The best-known application of this approach is the quantitative analysis of cross-sectional wealth inequality
(Aiyagari 1994; Huggett 1996; Casta~ neda et al. 2003). See Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) for a survey.
12autoregressive (AR) component. In particular, if the true earnings process has both a persistent
and a transitory component, but if the postulated model assumes that all shocks are equally
persistent, then the estimated AR autocorrelation coe±cient will be somewhere between the
true values for the persistent and transitory shocks. This explains why some early papers in
the literature ascribed low persistence to shocks (e.g., Heaton and Lucas 1996).
For a given unconditional variance of earnings, an AR(1) with low autocorrelation, say,
½ = 0:80, has very di®erent implications for equilibrium allocations as compared to, say, a
process composed of a unit-root part and a transitory part. In particular, incorporating highly
persistent shocks can help explain the hump shape of average consumption over the life cycle,
through the precautionary savings of the young (Gourinchas and Parker 2002). Their cumu-
lation over time can generate a growing age pro¯le of consumption inequality (Deaton and
Paxson 1994; Storesletten et al. 2004a). Moreover, the more persistent are shocks, the lower
will be the equilibrium risk-free interest rate (Huggett 1993) and, under conditions discussed
in Section 5, the higher the equity premium (Mankiw 1986).
Third, even with highly persistent earnings shocks, it is notoriously di±cult for the baseline
SIM model to generate a highly concentrated wealth distribution (see, for example, Huggett
1996).15 As noted by Casta~ neda et al. (2003), the typical strategy of calibrating the exogenous
earnings process using panel data is °awed because surveys like the PSID typically undersample
the rich and top-code their earnings. They show that one way to replicate the high concen-
tration of wealth observed in the US is to allow for a \rare event" in which individual income
productivity becomes extremely high.
Initial conditions In an in°uential paper, Keane and Wolpin (1997) argued that 90% of
lifetime earnings dispersion is accounted for by factors that are predetermined at the time indi-
viduals enter the labor market. This ¯nding, taken at face value, means that macroeconomists
must allow for some degree of heterogeneity in initial conditions. More ambitiously, this hetero-
geneity should be endogenous, and connected to things like family environment and education
choices.
The simplest way to introduce these considerations into the standard model is to allow
15The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) reveals that the Gini coe±cient for net worth in the US economy
is around 0.78. This high degree of wealth inequality is due to extreme concentration at the top: the richest
1% holds around one-third of the aggregate stock, whereas the bottom half holds only 3% of it. See Budria et
al. (2002) for more details.
13the earnings process to have a third component, a ¯xed individual e®ect, and to estimate the
variance of the ¯xed e®ect from panel data. Storesletten et al. (2004a) follow this approach to
assess the relative roles of shocks and initial conditions in determining the rise of consumption
inequality over the life cycle. In their exercise, ¯xed e®ects account for slightly less than half
of the cross-sectional variation in lifetime earnings, substantially less than Keane and Wolpin's
estimate. The other half is explained by very persistent earnings shocks that cumulate over
time.
Since the inception of empirical analysis of income processes, two parallel approaches de-
veloped. Besides the pure ARIMA representation, several authors proposed an alternative
statistical model that gives heterogeneity in initial conditions a bigger role relative to shocks.
This alternative model features cross-sectional heterogeneity in deterministic (linear) log earn-
ings pro¯les (Lillard and Weiss 1979; Baker 1997; Haider 2001). Heterogeneity in the slope of
these pro¯les could be interpreted as capturing variation in \learning ability." Guvenen (forth-
coming) argues that the pure permanent-transitory model is statistically hard to distinguish,
in a typical panel dataset, from a model where income pro¯les are ex ante heterogeneous, and
shocks are much less persistent (e.g., with autocorrelation around 0:8). Under this approach,
most of life cycle inequality is the result of initial heterogeneity (in the slope of earnings pro¯les),
as in Keane and Wolpin (1997).
One might think that it would be straightforward to discriminate between these two views of
earnings dynamics by exploiting evidence on consumption dispersion over the life cycle: while
the permanent-transitory model predicts rising consumption dispersion with age, consumption
dispersion in the heterogeneous income pro¯le model should level o® as soon as agents have
accumulated a bu®er stock of savings to smooth relatively transitory life cycle shocks (Carroll
1997). Unfortunately, it isn't so easy. First, the consensus view on the facts about consumption
dispersion over the life cycle has changed over time. While Deaton and Paxson (1994) document
a thirty log point increase in the variance of log nondurable consumption between ages 25 and
65, subsequent authors have estimated much smaller increases. For example, the Heathcote et
al. (2005) estimate is growth of only ¯ve log points from age 25 to 65. One important reason
for this discrepancy is that Heathcote et al. use a longer sample period, extending beyond
the 1980s. Second, the amount of insurance agents can achieve in both models for earnings is
sensitive to seemingly minor details of the environment. On the one hand, if shocks are highly
14persistent (say, ½ = 0:85) rather than permanent (½ = 1), then the standard life cycle model
features much more consumption insurance over the life cycle (Storesletten et al. 2004a; Kaplan
and Violante 2008). On the other hand, if agents gradually learn about their idiosyncratic slope
coe±cient in a Bayesian fashion, one can generate a sizeable life cycle increase in consumption
dispersion in the heterogeneous income pro¯le framework (Guvenen 2007).
Preference heterogeneity represents an alternative way to introduce di®erences in initial con-
ditions. Historically, macroeconomists have been reluctant to ¯ddle too much with preferences,
because their inherent unobservability puts little discipline on the exercise. However, there are
exceptions that have proved fruitful.
Krusell and Smith (1997) suppose that agents di®er in their degree of patience, and ¯nd
that small but persistent dispersion in discount rates can generate large wealth inequality in
the cross section.
Heathcote et al. (2007) note that the cross-sectional covariance between individual produc-
tivity and hours worked in the US data is negative, while the covariance between consumption
and hours is positive. When income e®ects dominate substitution e®ects, highly persistent pro-
ductivity shocks induce a negative sign for both correlations. Now add ¯xed heterogeneity in
the taste for leisure. The covariance between productivity and hours is invariant to preference
heterogeneity, but the covariance between consumption and hours is a®ected positively, since
individuals with a strong preference for leisure work less, earn less, and consume less. Enough
preference heterogeneity can therefore switch the sign of this latter covariance from negative to
positive.
Policy implications Distinguishing between initial conditions and labor market shocks
is important, since they have profoundly di®erent policy implications. Insofar as we are inter-
ested in designing policies that reduce inequality among households, models emphasizing initial
conditions suggest that the intervention should be targeted early in the life of an individual,
possibly during childhood, when the key components of learning ability and preferences are
malleable. Models based on labor market shocks call for policy interventions that allow un-
lucky workers to rebuild their skills, or to simply smooth consumption e®ectively, after a shock.
Examples of both types of policies abound in the US economy.
153.1.2 Forecastability of earnings dynamics
Economists have long recognized that agents may have superior information to the econometri-
cian, and that what appears to be a shock to the latter may have been foreseen by the agent.
Since an earnings change that was foreseen is likely to have very di®erent implications than
a pure shock, one should devise ways to identify how much of earnings dynamics are actually
forecastable. But this cannot be done using earnings data in isolation.
According to Blundell et al. (forthcoming), the advance information hypothesis clashes with
at least one dimension of the data. With advance information, future earnings growth, say, at
date t + k (with k > 0), should be correlated with current consumption growth at date t. But
this correlation in the data is not signi¯cant. The large amount of measurement error in the
data, though, makes this a weak test.16 An alternative strategy for identifying the predictable
component of earnings would be to exploit survey questions, available in some datasets, where
households are asked to report a probability distribution over changes in earnings in the next
calendar year. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) exploit this idea on Italian data.
A growing literature is attempting to use data on a variety of economic choices (labor supply,
consumption, education) to separate risk from predictable changes in labor income (Cunha et
al. 2005; Guvenen and Smith 2008). To understand the di±culty of the task, consider the
exercise carried out by Primiceri and van Rens (forthcoming). They use the permanent income
hypothesis to identify as \predictable inequality" the fraction of permanent shocks to earnings
that do not translate into inequality in consumption. In similar exercises, however, Blundell
et al. (forthcoming) and Heathcote et al. (2007) relax the ¯nancial market structure, allowing
for additional insurance beyond a risk-free bond, and identify as \insurable" that very same
fraction. In other words, the issue of predictability versus shocks is intimately linked to the
issue of availability of insurance, which we will discuss in Section 4. More detailed data on
private transfers and individual portfolios might help in discriminating between insurability
and forecastability.
16Moreover, this test has no power against the strict (i.e., no learning) heterogeneous income pro¯le model,
since all the information is revealed at time zero.
163.1.3 Microfoundation of earnings dynamics
The early literature modeled labor income as purely exogenous, but for a number of questions
it is important to recognize that individual earnings dynamics have an endogenous component
re°ecting decisions about labor supply, job search behavior, human capital accumulation, and
occupational choice. Therefore, a substantial portion of earnings dispersion may re°ect di®erent
choices rather than di®erent shocks.
Labor supply Economists have long recognized that women's labor supply is very elastic,
since historically they have been the secondary earner in the household. The most recent
estimates of males' intertemporal labor supply elasticity converge on values around 0.5 (Domeij
and Flod¶ en 2006; Pistaferri 2003).
With an explicit decision of how many hours to supply to the market, uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic risk is transferred from earnings to hourly wages. The way wage uncertainty transmits
to earnings, and eventually to consumption, is not trivial and depends on the balance between
substitution and income e®ects, where the presence of income e®ects re°ects market incom-
pleteness.
Permanent (or very persistent) shocks have large income e®ects, hence hours worked tend to
o®set the wage shock in the transmission to earnings. Transitory shocks have negligible income
e®ects, and thus °exible labor supply ampli¯es wage shocks, further increasing the volatility of
earnings. Heathcote et al. (2008b) interpret the rise in the cross-sectional wage-hours correla-
tion observed for the US as the result of increasing transitory wage volatility. Moreover, they
show that with endogenous labor supply, a rise in transitory (i.e., largely insurable) uncertainty
can be welfare improving (see the Box for details).
Job search The standard model assumes competitive labor markets, where individual
hourly wages are proportional to individual labor productivity. Search frictions break this
connection. Individual wage dynamics become a combination of exogenous productivity shocks
at the individual level, and stochastic transitions between employment status, or between jobs,
which are, at least in part, choices for the worker. Low et al. (2007) separately identify the two
types of labor market uncertainty: productivity versus labor market transitions. They argue
that the former induce considerably larger welfare losses, because in addition to being more
persistent they are also more exogenous from the worker's perspective.
17Postel-Vinay and Turon (2008) develop a search model where workers can accept or reject
job o®ers, and where earnings are renegotiated between ¯rm and worker when the latter is in
danger of being poached by another ¯rm. Interestingly, the model can generate very persistent
earnings dynamics, even though the original productivity shocks are uncorrelated over time.
This o®ers a structural microfoundation for commonly used ARIMA-type processes.
Incorporating fully °edged search models of the labor market into equilibrium incomplete
markets models is a promising new research avenue. In a model with on-the-job search and
exogenous layo®s, Lise (2007) shows that workers who have experienced a long sequence of
favorable job o®ers and sit at the top of the wage ladder have a very strong precautionary
saving motive associated to the danger of losing the high wage through a layo®|a mechanism
that a symmetric exogenous wage process would not induce. As a result, the model can generate
a sizeable degree of wealth concentration.
Human capital Huggett et al. (2006) model earnings dynamics through risky human
capital accumulation. Each individual can devote time either to work or to accumulating skills.
Uninsurable, idiosyncratic shocks hit the individual-level technology that produces new skills
from the time input and the undepreciated stock of past human capital. Individual di®erences
in initial levels of human capital, learning ability, and shock histories translate into inequality in
lifetime earnings and consumption. This framework, based on the original Ben-Porath model,
o®ers some microfoundation for statistical models of earnings dynamics with heterogeneous
income pro¯les.
A major challenge in this framework is to identify the process of exogenous shocks, since a
wage decline between two periods can be due either to a shock or to a choice to accumulate
additional human capital. Huggett at al. exploit the same idea as Heckman et al. (1998):
after a certain age, little or no new human capital is produced, hence wage dynamics are
entirely determined by shocks. However, self-selection into retirement of those workers with
large negative shocks could undermine this approach.
Explicitly modeling the education choice, as opposed to human capital accumulation, has
the drawback of abstracting from skill formation during working life, but it has the advantage
of being more directly observable. The role of education choices in mitigating risk is clear in
the context of the literature on the rise in the US college premium. Consider a model where
di®erentials in educational attainment are represented by ¯xed individual e®ects in earnings,
18exogenously distributed in the population. A rise in the college premium corresponds to a rise
in the variance of ¯xed e®ects, which leads, mechanically, to an ex ante welfare loss (Krueger
and Perri 2003). Suppose, instead, that what is exogenously distributed in the population are
education costs, and individuals choose whether to become college graduates by comparing
costs and returns. A rise in the college premium will induce a fraction of individuals, those
with low enough costs, to switch from the low to the high education group. This °exibility can
generate welfare gains from a rise in the college premium (Heathcote et al. 2008b).
Self-selection An additional dimension of endogeneity in earnings dynamics is that
agents may optimally self-select into groups bearing more or less risk. Consider two recent
examples in the literature.
First, it is well known that entrepreneurs have more volatile incomes than workers. Quadrini
(2000) develops a model where some agents choose to become entrepreneurs because they have
a \project," i.e., a potentially pro¯table idea. The income stream of the project is riskier than
workers' labor income: it can fail, but if successful it can lead to very large payo®s. These two
forces induce a subset of agents in the economy (those with entrepreneurial ideas) to save at
a higher rate, and a smaller subset of these (the successful) to accumulate large amounts of
income and wealth. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) extend this framework by endogenizing ¯rm
size and incorporating borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs. These models can explain the
high concentration of net worth observed at the top of the distribution in the US and shed light
on the size distribution of ¯rms.
Second, Schulhofer-Wohl (forthcoming) exploits a question about risk tolerance in the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to document that less risk-averse individuals are those
with the widest earnings °uctuations during their working life, suggesting that preference het-
erogeneity may be an important factor in occupational choice and risk allocation.
Policy implications A major drawback of the baseline framework, where ex ante iden-
tical agents face exogenous earnings shocks, is that policy analysis is very limited. Only the
(ex post) lucky become rich, and only the (ex post) unlucky become poor. Any redistributive
°at or progressive labor income tax is welfare-improving. Ex ante welfare would be maximized
by taxing away all individual earnings and redistributing them lump-sum.
The additional microfoundations discussed in this section establish a well-de¯ned ¯scal
19policy trade-o®. Besides the usual welfare gain from redistribution, there are new welfare losses.
Taxes distort the e±cient choices for hours worked, on-the-job search e®ort, college enrollment,
selection into self-employment, and so on. Overall, the consequences of ¯scal policies in these
models become rich and complex, with some agents losing and others gaining, as we would
expect in actual economies.
3.2 Beyond earnings: additional sources of risks
Health shocks Modeling health shocks is a more complex task than modeling productivity
shocks, because health status potentially impacts the agent's utility function, in addition to
her budget constraint.
The impact of health shocks on preferences is twofold. First, a worsening of health status
translates into an increase in mortality rates. This is important because survival probabilities
a®ect discounting, and hence saving and human capital accumulation. Second, it is plausible
that an individual in bad health would not derive the same utility from many types of (non-
medical) consumption expenditures. Palumbo (1999) estimates that a negative health shock
signi¯cantly reduces the marginal utility of nonmedical consumption.
Health has a large impact on earnings. Based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS), Attanasio et al. (2008) ¯nd that individuals who report a deterioration of (subjective)
health status from \good" to \bad" experience an average fall in hourly wages of 15%.At the
same time, health shocks induce households to purchase insurance and a range of medical
goods and services. A common approach has been to treat medical spending (like earnings)
as exogenous, and to estimate a stochastic process for expenditure shocks. French and Jones
(2004) ¯t a statistical model comprising persistent and transitory components as well as a
low-probability catastrophic event: with probability 0.1% per year, households are hit by an
expenditure shock beyond $100,000 in present value.
Enriching incomplete markets models by introducing health shocks is important for at least
three reasons. First, modeling health shocks allows one to address the issue of how well private
markets and current institutions (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) function in insuring households.
Second, uncertainty about health status is a key driving force for the saving decisions of the
elderly (Palumbo 1999; De Nardi et al. 2006). Third, a nontrivial probability of receiving large
expenditure shocks after retirement could explain why annuity markets are so thin: they are
20not e®ective in providing ¯nancial security (Sinclair and Smetters 2004).
Finally, the role of initial conditions and endogeneity are as relevant for health inequality
as for earnings inequality. Case et al. (2002) ¯nd that poor families spend little on their
children's health, and that poor initial health conditions persist into adulthood. Moreover,
individuals make more or less healthy choices (with respect to diet, smoking habits, exercise,
etc.) throughout their life. Therefore, health status is best modeled as an endogenous stock
that depreciates stochastically over time, with individuals deciding how much to invest every
period. The main challenge is how to parameterize this technology.
Families as shocks For many people, the biggest events in life involve changes in family
composition: marriage, divorce, the birth of children, the death of a parent or spouse. Many
of these events have an important exogenous component, and as such represent an important
source of risk. Cubeddu and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003) embed marital status risk in an incomplete
markets model and conclude that this type of risk is a larger source of precautionary saving
than earnings risk. At the same time, as we will discuss in the next section, the family is an
important source of insurance, since individuals are altruistically connected to their parents,
siblings, spouses, and children. Young children depend heavily on their parents, a nonworking
spouse on his or her partner, an elderly widow on her adult o®spring.
Clearly, while events such as marriage, divorce, and fertility contain an exogenous compo-
nent (risk), they also involve some decision making. Models with a component of endogenous
choice are required to study the e®ects of policies such as divorce laws or welfare assistance to
children of single-headed families (e.g., Aiyagari et al. 2000).
Shocks to capital In most incomplete markets models, shocks to labor productivity
are the only source of idiosyncratic income risk. In reality, there is also substantial variation
in the return to capital, which for public equity shows up as cross-sectional variation in stock
returns. However, traded stocks are easily diversi¯ed. Private equity is where idiosyncratic
capital income risk really matters for risk sharing, since here it translates directly into income
risk for the self-employed. Quadrini (2000) pioneered the quantitative study of this source of
risk. In Angeletos and Calvet (2006) each agent is an entrepreneur and faces idiosyncratic risk
in private production and investment. They show that a private equity risk premium works to
reduce the aggregate capital stock, o®setting the familiar positive precautionary saving e®ect.
21Housing represents another important source of capital income risk, since housing is a major
component of households' portfolios, and house prices have a large idiosyncratic component as-
sociated to geographical location (Davis and Heathcote, 2007). This risk is not easily diversi¯ed
by spreading ownership across a range of properties because rental markets function poorly.
In general, capital income risk remains relatively underexplored within this class of models.
Correlation among sources of risk Finally, it is important to recognize that all these
shocks can be correlated. For example, a job displacement can put family relations under strain
and lead to a divorce. A deterioration in health status, such as a long illness or a disability, can
induce a permanent loss in earnings. A decline in labor demand in a speci¯c geographical area
(e.g., a plant closing) can trigger a fall in local housing prices, creating a comovement between
individual shocks to earnings and shocks to wealth.
These considerations suggest that a multivariate system, with nonzero cross-correlations
among shocks, may be the appropriate statistical model to capture the various sources of
idiosyncratic risk faced by households.
4 Channels of insurance
What are individuals' key channels of insurance against the risks described in the previous
section? At one extreme, as we discussed in the Introduction, one could assume complete
markets against idiosyncratic risk. However, while this is a useful theoretical benchmark, it is
soundly rejected by the data. The earliest versions of the standard incomplete markets model
incorporated just one insurance vehicle: risk-free saving. As we will now describe, this view of
insurance is too limited, since it abstracts from a range of other channels that allow individuals
to pool risks. Thus, the truth is somewhere in between the economy with a complete set of
state-contingent claims, and the economy with a single bond. In this section we focus on the
insurance-providing roles of (1) ¯nancial markets, (2) labor supply decisions, (3) the family,
and (4) the government.17
17We will not discuss the role of insurance provided by ¯rms to their employees, which has yet to attract
much quantitative theoretical work. Guiso et al. (2005) estimate that Italian ¯rms provide their workers with
considerable insurance against shocks to ¯rm performance, especially when such shocks are transitory.
224.1 Financial markets
The early heterogeneous agents macro literature built on the classic income °uctuation problem,
in which agents use risk-free saving and borrowing to smooth consumption in the face of shocks
to income. It was quickly recognized that the extent of insurance agents could achieve using
risk-free assets would depend critically on the size and persistence of shocks (see Section 3), the
net supply of assets available for smoothing, and the extent of borrowing permitted. In fact,
these last two are °ip sides of the same coin, because what ultimately determines individuals'
ability to smooth consumption is how far they are from the borrowing constraint. Thus, giving
all agents an extra dollar of wealth or loosening the borrowing constraint by a dollar has very
similar e®ects on allocations (see Proposition 1 in Ljungqvist and Sargent 2004, for a formal
discussion).
In Bewley (1983) agents were completely prevented from borrowing. At the other extreme,
Aiyagari (1994) required only that they were able to repay debts with probability one|the
\natural" borrowing limit. Zhang (1997) gave borrowers the option to default on debt, making
willingness to pay rather than ability to pay central to the determination of borrowing limits. In
his model, when contemplating default, borrowers expect to be punished by su®ering permanent
exclusion from ¯nancial markets. Default does not occur in equilibrium, because borrowing
limits are tight enough to ensure that agents at least weakly prefer to repay debts in every
possible future state. An important feature of these \endogenous" borrowing constraints is
that their position is sensitive to changes in other details of the environment: for example if
shocks become larger, incentives to maintain access to credit in order to smooth consumption
will be strengthened, and thus it should be possible to support more borrowing in equilibrium.
In reality, of course, default is an option, and potentially an important one from the per-
spective of self-insurance, since it allows borrowers to make the amount of debt they repay a
function of the shocks that hit them. For example, one could envision choosing to default on
debts in the event of a job loss or a large unanticipated medical expense, and repaying other-
wise. The cost to households of defaulting on debts depends on the extent to which they are
subsequently able to protect themselves from creditors and to regain access to credit markets,
which in turn depend in large part on the details of bankruptcy law.
Several papers, beginning with Athreya (2002), develop quantitative extensions of the stan-
dard incomplete markets model to allow for default. In Livshits et al. (2007) and Chatterjee
23et al. (2007) lenders o®er a menu of loan contracts, one for each level of borrowing, such that
larger loans come with higher interest rates to re°ect increased probability of default. These
models allow one to explore the welfare implications of alternative bankruptcy laws. An im-
portant general result here is that policymakers face a trade-o®. On the one hand, treating
bankrupts more harshly makes self-insurance via precautionary saving easier in equilibrium,
since stronger incentives to repay debts lower default-risk premia and thus the cost of borrow-
ing. On the other hand, as bankruptcy becomes more costly, debtors become less likely to
exercise this option: in the limit, debt is e®ectively noncontingent.
In addition to the literature on unsecured credit, there is a parallel literature on the role
of housing and secured credit (mortgages) as a source of both risk and insurance. Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2002) examine the quantitative impact for consumption and saving
behavior of incorporating durables (mostly housing) in an incomplete markets life cycle model.
In models of this sort, housing tends to hinder consumption smoothing early in the life cycle,
since individuals want to buy a house (owning is preferred to renting), but home buying typically
requires a down payment, which leaves home buyers liquidity constrained. At the same time,
like any other asset, housing wealth is also a vehicle for self-insurance. Venti and Wise (2001)
¯nd that older home owners sometimes reduce home equity in response to shocks to family
status, like entry to a nursing home or the death of a spouse.
However, home equity is rarely used to ¯nance general consumption in retirement, which
has spurred a debate on whether it should be included in measures of household net worth. This
question is important, because incomplete markets models are typically calibrated to replicate
the empirical wealth to income ratio, and thus what counts as wealth impacts the extent of
equilibrium self-insurance.
Beyond housing and risk-free savings, other important components of household wealth
include private pensions, social security, and public and private equity. The quantitative macro-
¯nance literature generates predictions for optimal portfolio diversi¯cation given the nature of
the risk individuals face|for example, how individuals should adjust the equity-bond mix as
they move through the life cycle (see Section 5). A general ¯nding is that in a model with
heterogeneous agents, individuals will choose to hold di®erent portfolios, such that risk sharing
is e®ectively improved. For example, risky equity will be disproportionately held by individuals
who either face little idiosyncratic risk, or have relatively high tolerance for risk, or receive
24non-asset income that co-moves negatively with the stock market.18 Empirically, however,
investors appear to invest in stocks that co-move closely with their non¯nancial income (Massa
and Simonov 2006), which poses a puzzle. Chien et al. (2008) is a recent example of a model
economy populated by traders who are heterogeneous in the degree of sophistication with which
they hedge their labor income risk.
The recent trend toward easier access to credit suggests that households are now better
placed to use ¯nancial markets to insure against idiosyncratic shocks. For example, it is now
easier to use credit cards and home equity loans or lines of credit to smooth idiosyncratic
income shocks. At the same time, however, ¯nancial market innovation may have left the
economy more susceptible to aggregate shocks. In the late 2000s, declining house prices left
many Americans with negative home equity, spurring a wave of mortgage defaults and a general
credit crunch. Developing a better understanding of the relationship between access to credit
at the individual level and the response of the economy to aggregate shocks is a priority for
future work (see Chambers et al. 2008 or Kiyotaki et al. 2007).
Finally, the insurance industry o®ers explicit insurance against certain types of idiosyncratic
risk (e.g., property risks, health, disability, uncertain longevity, death of a spouse). Surprisingly
little work has been done on attempting to quantify the value of insurance provided by these
markets. Exceptions include a small literature on the interaction between social security and
private annuity and life insurance markets (Hong and R¶ ³os-Rull 2007 and Hosseini 2008 are
recent examples) and on the impact of tax subsidies to employer-based health insurance (Jeske
and Kitao 2007).
4.2 Insurance from labor supply
Individuals' labor market choices present a range of insurance opportunities. The simplest
example is that individuals can adjust hours in response to °uctuations in their wages. As
with any margin of adjustment, endowing agents with the ability to adjust hours must make
them at least weakly better o®. Papers exploring the insurance value of hours °exibility, and
the interaction between °exible labor supply and precautionary savings, include Low (2005),
Flod¶ en (2006), Pijoan-Mas (2006), and Marcet et al. (2007). Heathcote et al. (2007) describe
18Note, however, that theoretically it is only in the limit, when markets are almost complete, that introducing
additional assets is guaranteed to improve risk sharing and welfare.
25a tractable environment in which optimal labor supply can be characterized in closed form.
These expressions clarify that individuals will optimally increase hours in response to positive
idiosyncratic shocks that can be directly insured via ¯nancial markets, but will tend to adjust
hours inversely in response to wage shocks that would otherwise translate one for one into
consumption.
In reality, workers need not passively accept the wage they are o®ered in their current job.
The search-matching literature has long emphasized the importance of endogenizing choices
to form and dissolve matches, as well as the choice of search intensity. A few recent papers
integrate these sorts of models within the SIM framework (see Krusell et al. 2007, Lise 2007).
Kambourov and Manovski (forthcoming) emphasize the importance of changing occupations
in response to occupation-speci¯c productivity shocks, while Hassler et al. (2005) focus on
changing geographic region in response to unemployment and location-speci¯c shocks.
4.3 Insurance within the family
The lion's share of work on quantitative heterogeneous agent models have focused on the
\bachelor household"|one breadwinner per household. While this approach has o®ered many
valuable insights, it is clear that abstracting from multi-member families misses a potentially
important source of insurance. Moreover, extending the standard incomplete markets envi-
ronment to incorporate an explicit model of the household allows for a more natural mapping
between data and model: individual-level data on earnings and hours and household-level data
on consumption and wealth can be directly compared to their model counterparts.
Attanasio et al. (2005) argue that the ability of wives to adjust labor market participation
decisions o®ers valuable insurance against shocks to their husbands' earnings. The potential for
this type of insurance has risen over time with the narrowing of the gender wage gap (Heathcote
et al. 2008b). However, more work is required to uncover the joint process for husband and
wife labor market risk, a task complicated by the fact that market wages are not observed for
spouses who specialize in home production.
Intergenerational transfers in the form of investment of parental time and money in child care
and education are very large and o®er a degree of insurance against the risk that children are
unlucky in their draw for initial conditions (see Mulligan 1997 for a comprehensive review). Fogli
(2004) notes that in countries with poorly developed credit markets and rigid labor markets,
26a higher fraction of young people tend to live at home, suggesting that insurance within the
family can substitute for self-insurance through ¯nancial markets. Similarly, Kaplan (2007)
argues that for young workers, the option to transit between living independently and living
with parents is an important channel of insurance against labor market risk.
Of course, a critical issue for quantifying the extent of within-family insurance is to under-
stand how other family members enter into individual preferences. There is as yet no consensus
on what is the right way to model the family, and how much insurance is provided within
that model. Many macro models adopt the unitary model of the household (e.g., Regalia and
R¶ ³os-Rull 2001, Attanasio et al. 2005, Heathcote et al. 2008b). The unitary model assumes
that family members share the same preferences and collaborate to maximize aggregate family
utility. Thus, all individual risks that are imperfectly correlated across family members are
pooled. In response to shocks, family members reallocate time devoted to market work, home
production and leisure, and conduct monetary or in-kind transfers within the family.
However, various implications of the unitary model have been tested empirically and typi-
cally rejected (see, for example, Bourguignon et al. 1993). Lise and Seitz (forthcoming) estimate
a collective model of the household and ¯nd large di®erences in consumption between husbands
and wives. Most collective models of the family are static in nature, and although these models
endow family members with heterogeneous preferences, they require that allocations within the
family be Pareto optimal. In a dynamic model, Pareto e±ciency implies that idiosyncratic risks
within the family realized after family formation end up perfectly insured. However, Mazzocco
(2007) tests and rejects the hypothesis of intra-household commitment, suggesting that ex ante
e±ciency in marriage is too much to hope for.
Several other modeling routes have been explored. Two pioneering papers that model non-
cooperative intra-family interaction are Aiyagari et al. (2000) and Nishiyama (2002). Another
way to model husband and wife interaction is to require that allocations maximize risk sharing,
subject to neither spouse wanting to terminate the relationship. Ligon (2002) builds a dynamic
model in which threat points|and thus Pareto weights|evolve over time, and characterizes
ex post e±cient allocations. Finally, Greenwood et al. (2003) build a model that allows for
marital dissolution, though their model has limited dynamics. We expect more quantitative
work in this area.
274.4 Public insurance
On top of insurance provided privately through markets and the family, the government provides
important additional risk sharing via redistributive taxation and various social insurance pro-
grams. There is a vast quantitative literature exploring the welfare implications of alternative
public policies, beginning with Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987). Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
explored how government debt expands the net supply of assets available for self-insurance.
Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Storesletten et al. (1999), Huggett
and Ventura (1999) and Huggett and Parra (2008) examine the role of social security as a
partial insurance and redistribution device. Flod¶ en (2001) explores the interaction between
debt and public transfers. Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005)
consider the distributional impacts of changing the balance between taxation of labor, capital,
and consumption. Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa et al. (forthcoming) investigate the
tradeo® between e±ciency and insurance associated with progressive taxation. Hansen and Im-
rohoroglu (1992), Low et al. (2007) and Lentz (forthcoming) conduct quantitative explorations
of unemployment insurance.
Perhaps the most important government program from a redistributional perspective is pub-
lic education, which constitutes a sizeable transfer to children from poorer families (Fernandez
and Rogerson 2003). Public health care programs are another important equalizing force. In
the United States, Medicaid is explicitly means-tested and partially covers medical costs for
low-income households. Medicare is larger than Medicaid in terms of budget, but its progres-
sivity is still debated: whereas high-income individuals pay higher Medicare taxes, they also
receive more bene¯ts as retirees because of their longer life expectancy (McClellan and Skinner
2006).
To what extent does public insurance crowd out private insurance? Hubbard et al. (1995)
showed that means-tested social insurance programs provide disincentives to accumulate pre-
cautionary savings and thus reduce self-insurance. Attanasio and R¶ ³os-Rull (2000) and Krueger
and Perri (2005) explore environments with enforcement frictions in which public tax and trans-
fer policies reduce the scope for private insurance within the family or through ¯nancial markets
by weakening repayment incentives.
Quantifying insurance Two central themes of this review are that while households
28face many sources of risk, they also enjoy access to many di®erent forms of insurance. The
papers discussed above generally adopt the strategy of building models that incorporate the key
sources of risk for the question of interest, and then modeling explicitly what are likely to be
the most important avenues of insurance. One way to evaluate such models is to ask whether
they deliver the right amount of insurance overall. Kaplan and Violante (2008) argue that the
baseline SIM model has somewhat less consumption insurance against permanent shocks than
is suggested by micro data. Heathcote et al. (2008b) build a richer version of the SIM model in
which individuals can insure against shocks to labor productivity via a range of mechanisms.
In addition to risk-free savings, the model incorporates °exible labor supply, human capital
investment, transfers between husband and wife, and social security. They argue that this
model is broadly consistent with the evolution of cross-sectional inequality in consumption and
hours, both over the life cycle and over time.
An alternative strategy is to be more agnostic about the details of speci¯c insurance mech-
anisms, and to combine minimal model structure with panel data on earnings, consumption,
and hours in order to quantify the fraction of total risk that households appear to be insuring
in practice. This approach is followed by Blundell et al. (forthcoming) and Heathcote et al.
(2007).
5 Heterogeneity and the aggregate economy
Our third theme is the impact of individual-level risk on the aggregate economy. We begin
by arguing that changes in the magnitude and the nature (i.e., insurability) of idiosyncratic
uncertainty can have large e®ects on average quantities and on prices. Next, we introduce
aggregate risk into the SIM model, and we examine some important methodological issues that
arise. Finally, we study how the answer to some classic questions pertaining to the aggregate
economy|initially studied within representative agent models|change once analyzed within
the SIM model. We examine the welfare costs of business cycles and in°ation, as well as asset
pricing.
5.1 Impact of microeconomic uncertainty on aggregate levels
Consider ¯rst the saving decision. SIM models with exogenous earnings predict that higher
earnings risk triggers larger precautionary savings and, hence, a higher capital stock. As a
29result, in equilibrium, the interest rate is lower, the wage rate is higher, and average output
per hour worked (labor productivity) increases (Aiyagari 1994).
More surprising, perhaps, is that heterogeneity can also a®ect average labor productivity
through labor supply. To see this, consider a model with endogenous labor supply, where
agents are subject to exogenous °uctuations in their e±ciency units of labor. The labor market
is competitive, so individual wages re°ect individual productivity. Suppose that there are two
orthogonal sources of wage risk, one purely transitory (hence insurable) and one permanent
(hence hard to insure).
When most of the risk is transitory, individuals with relatively high wage draws will work
relatively long hours, and thus aggregate labor productivity will be high. This e®ect is stronger
the higher is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and the larger is the insurable fraction of
wage dispersion. Conversely, suppose that most of the risk is permanent. Now, if wealth
e®ects are strong enough, individuals who experience a wage rate reduction will increase their
hours worked in order to mitigate the fall in consumption, which implies that aggregate labor
productivity will fall. Heathcote et al. (2008a) illustrate how this mechanism a®ects the welfare
analysis of labor market risk. For details, see the enclosed Box.
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
BOX: THE WELFARE ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET RISK WITH
FLEXIBLE LABOR SUPPLY
What are the welfare implications of wage risk? On the one hand, greater wage volatility
makes incomplete insurance more costly. On the other, it o®ers opportunities to increase
productivity by working harder when wages are higher. Heathcote et al. (2008a) analyze
an economy in which there is perfect insurance against transitory wage shocks, but permanent
shocks cannot be insured directly. They study the welfare gain from completing markets against
idiosyncratic risk (i.e., fully insuring permanent shocks to wages).
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, completing markets generates two positive welfare e®ects
(expressed as permanent percentage changes in consumption): (i) a gain of °v=2 from elimi-
nating the variance v of permanent risk, where ° is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion, and
(ii) a further gain of ¾v=2 from increasing by the same amount v the variance of insurable risk,
where ¾ is workers' Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The ¯rst expression is analogous to Lucas
30(1987), though here it applies to (large) idiosyncratic risk, rather than (small) aggregate risk.
The second expression is new and re°ects the fact that insurable wage risk is welfare-improving
with °exible labor supply. Surprisingly, a plausible calibration implies that most of the welfare
gains can be attributed to higher aggregate productivity rather than reduced inequality.
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
5.2 Krusell and Smith (1998)
Computational complexity In all dynamic, rational expectation models, agents must form
(rational) forecasts of future prices in order to optimize behavior. In a representative agent
economy, equilibrium prices depend on a handful of aggregate state variables, and this problem
is relatively simple to solve. However, once aggregation is abandoned, market-clearing prices
become a function of the entire distribution of agents (see R¶ ³os-Rull 1995). Forecasting prices
now requires a law of motion for the distribution. But literally including the distribution (an
in¯nite-dimensional mathematical object) among the state variables when solving the numerical
problem is not feasible.19
An important breakthrough came when Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) proposed to ap-
proximate the numerical optimization problem by assuming a form of near-rational behavior:
agents view prices as evolving only as functions of a ¯nite set of moments of the distribution
(e.g., its mean and variance), and they optimize given a forecasting rule that depends only on
these moments. Krusell and Smith describe an iterative procedure for computing the forecast-
error-minimizing coe±cients for this rule. Agents are near rational in the sense that when they
optimize given the forecasting rule, errors for market-clearing prices turn out to be very small
ex post.
This methodology greatly extends the range of questions that can be studied within this
class of models and creates a rich environment to analyze the interaction between idiosyncratic
and aggregate risk. However, a caveat remains. Even if the economy evolves very nearly as
19In order to sidestep this issue, early work either examined aggregate °uctuations in economies with ¯xed
interest rates (Imrohoroglu 1989) or assumed the existence of a monetary authority setting a \policy rule" for
the interest rate as a function only of the exogenous aggregate states (D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez et al. 1992).
Subsequent contributions addressed the problem by keeping the number of di®erent types low. Telmer
(1993) and Lucas (1994) solved a class of models with only two types of agents, thereby minimizing the \curse
of dimensionality."R¶ ³os-Rull (1994) instead proposed a set of linear quadratic approximations in overlapping
generations models with heterogeneity across generations but no within-cohort inequality.
31expected when agents take as given a low dimensional forecasting rule, there is no guarantee
that its aggregate dynamics are close to those in the true rational expectations equilibrium.
Krusell and Smith suggest experimenting with adding additional moments to the forecasting
rule to ensure that, locally at least, aggregate dynamics are not sensitive to expanding agents'
information sets.20
Approximate aggregation Recall that in the neoclassical growth model with complete
markets, one obtains perfect aggregation because, with homothetic preferences, Engel curves
(consumption functions of wealth) are linear (Chatterjee 1994). In SIM models, instead, con-
sumption decision rules are generally concave in wealth (Deaton 1991), so aggregate consump-
tion will depend on the distribution of wealth, and perfect aggregation will fail. However,
Krusell and Smith and subsequent users of their methodology have found that even though
SIM economies do not perfectly aggregate in theory, these models often deliver \approximate
aggregation" in practice. Krusell and Smith coined this term to label their key result that \in
equilibrium all aggregate variables [...] can be almost perfectly described as a function of two
simple statistics: the mean of the wealth distribution and the aggregate productivity shock."
In addition, Krusell and Smith also document that the aggregate simulated time series
from their incomplete markets model are almost indistinguishable from those generated by a
representative agent economy with identical preferences. However, one should not assume that
there always exists a representative agent economy that produces the same aggregate dynamics
as the incomplete markets economy. This is an important di®erence with respect to complete
markets environments, where exact aggregation and existence of a representative agent go hand
in hand. An example that illustrates this point is Heathcote (2005), who considers lump-sum
changes in the timing of taxes in a SIM model. He ¯nds that approximate aggregation holds in
the Krusell-Smith sense (the state variables are aggregate capital, aggregate government debt,
and the current tax level). At the same time, however, changes in the timing of taxes turn out
to have large real e®ects { e®ects that would be absent in any representative agent economy,
where Ricardian equivalence holds.
20Krusell and Smith (1998) and virtually every other \user" of their methodology directly pose a recursive
formulation of the problem, with the distribution as a state. Recently, Miao (2006) established equivalence
between the recursive and sequential competitive equilibrium when the state space includes, in addition to
the distribution, the individual expected continuation values. But existence of a recursive equilibrium de¯ned
without this latter state variable, and its relation with the sequential formulation, are still open questions.
32What are the limitations of the Krusell-Smith approach? Clearly, if aggregate shocks were
to systematically redistribute wealth across agents with di®erent propensities to consume out
of wealth, then a low dimensional forecasting rule could fail. Thus approximate aggregation
is more likely to hold, the closer to linear are consumption decision rules and the smaller is
the e®ect of aggregate shocks on wealth inequality. Small technology shocks { considered by
Krusell and Smith { do not change the wealth distribution much, while big shocks to taxes or
asset prices could have large e®ects.21
5.3 Welfare costs of business cycles and in°ation
Costs of business cycles Lucas (1987) showed that, in a representative agent framework,
the welfare gain from removing purely transitory °uctuations in aggregate consumption (relative
to a trend) is remarkably small|less than one-tenth of a percent of lifetime consumption for
standard preferences (i.e., a coe±cient of risk aversion between, say, one and ¯ve). However,
given the concern for business cycles among politicians and the general public, Lucas' ¯nding
has been viewed as a puzzle. Does introducing idiosyncratic risk change the answer to Lucas'
question?
As a ¯rst pass, suppose that individual risk and aggregate risk are independent and main-
tain Lucas' assumption that aggregate shocks are transitory. Then, with CRRA preferences,
it is easy to show that idiosyncratic risk has no in°uence on the cost of aggregate risk (Con-
stantinides and Du±e 1996; De Santis 2007). Mechanically, there are two ways to change the
joint stochastic process for aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to generate larger numbers than
Lucas for the cost of aggregate °uctuations.
The ¯rst is to maintain transitory aggregate shocks, but to assume that the variance of per-
sistent idiosyncratic shocks is positively correlated with the realization of the aggregate shock.
Storesletten et al. (2004b) o®er some evidence that in PSID data the variance of persistent
earnings shocks is substantially higher in recessions than in expansions. This mechanism am-
pli¯es the cost of business cycles, because the worst idiosyncratic shocks tend to occur when
aggregate times are already bad.22
21Huggett (1997) illustrates that a large wealth redistribution a®ects aggregate consumption in SIM envi-
ronments. Krueger and Kubler (2004) consider overlapping-generations economies with aggregate shocks to
productivity and depreciation rates and a large but ¯nite number of agents (< 30). They ¯nd that approximate
aggregation holds only when depreciation rates are deterministic, i.e., in cases without large shocks to wealth.
22Imrohoroglu (1989) also explores cyclical variation in idiosyncratic risk, but her focus is on unemployment
33The second is to maintain that the assumption that the variance of idiosyncratic shocks
is uncorrelated with the cycle, but to assume that both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
are permanent.23 Since both individual and average consumption appear highly persistent in
practice, this seems a reasonable thought experiment, even if it is not the experiment Lucas
originally had in mind. In this case, De Santis (2007) illustrates that aggregate °uctuations
are more costly in welfare terms when there are idiosyncratic °uctuations in the background.
This result re°ects the fact that lifetime utility declines increasingly quickly as one increases the
variance of permanent shocks and thus the growth rate of within-cohort consumption dispersion.
This convexity in lifetime utility means that the welfare gain from a marginal reduction in
permanent risk (whether aggregate or idiosyncratic in nature) is increasing in the initial variance
of permanent shocks. An important caveat is that De Santis assumes an in¯nite horizon setting.
The gains would be substantially smaller in a ¯nite life cycle model, because then consumption
inequality would not grow without bound.
To tackle the cost of business cycles question in an incomplete markets environment requires
describing a process for idiosyncratic risk in the counterfactual aggregate-risk-free economy.
However, existing models lack unifying microfoundations for aggregate and idiosyncratic risk,
and thus o®er little guidance on the right way to proceed. Di®erent statistical assumptions
will lead to di®erent results. Storesletten et al. (2001) and others propose setting the vari-
ance of earnings risk, in the counterfactual economy, equal to the unconditional variance of
individual earnings, averaged across business cycles. The welfare e®ects become much larger if
one assumes that removing business cycles would e®ectively reduce individual risk. Applying
the \integration principle" proposed by Krusell and Smith (1999), Krebs (2003, 2007) holds
constant the average standard deviation of (permanent) earnings shocks across experiments.
Due to Jensen's inequality, this amounts to assuming that the unconditional variance of income
risk is smaller in the absence of aggregate °uctuations. With CRRA utility the welfare cost
of °uctuations is approximately linear in the variance of log consumption. Accordingly, Krebs
¯nds large welfare gains from removing business cycles.
In a heterogeneous agents economy, one should expect cross-sectional di®erences in the
risk, rather than earnings risk as in Storesletten et al. (2001). She ¯nds gains from removing business cycles only
slightly larger than Lucas (1987), in part because unemployment spells are typically short in the US economy,
and thus relatively easy to smooth with savings.
23This idea is taken even further in the new literature on long-run risk, where the growth rate of consumption
has a persistent component (Bansal and Yaron 2004).
34gains from eliminating aggregate °uctuations. Krusell et al. (forthcoming) ¯nd that this
heterogeneity is quantitatively large: low-wealth agents enjoy a utility gain of up to 4% of
lifetime consumption. This result echoes the ¯nding of Storesletten et al. (2001), who report
the largest gains in their OLG economy for young households.
Empirically, incomes in the bottom half of the population °uctuate more over the business
cycle (Kydland 1984; R¶ ³os-Rull 1993), partly because unemployment is concentrated among
low-skilled and low-income workers. The welfare implications of aggregate risk in models where
business cycles a®ect certain types of workers di®erently have yet to be fully explored.
Costs of in°ation There is a related literature on the welfare cost of in°ation. In°ation
has potentially large distributional consequences. First, the poor hold a larger share of their
wealth in cash than the rich, and are therefore more vulnerable to high (expected) in°ation.
Erosa and Ventura (2002) demonstrate this e®ect using a monetary growth model extended to
feature incomplete markets and individual heterogeneity. At the aggregate level, their model
economy operates similarly to standard representative agent monetary models. However, the
burden of in°ation is disproportionately borne by the poor, in the form of a lower average
return on their savings (see also Imrohoroglu 1992; Albanesi 2007).
Second, an unexpected increase in in°ation will redistribute wealth away from those with
disproportionately large nominal asset positions. Doepke and Schneider (2006) quantify this
e®ect empirically. They ¯nd that a surprise increase in in°ation would induce large welfare
costs on old, rich individuals, who are the major bondholders in the economy.
Surprisingly, the study of monetary policy in macroeconomics has largely bypassed the SIM
model. D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez et al. (1992) is an early example within the SIM framework which
received very limited follow-up.
5.4 Asset pricing
In a seminal paper, Mehra and Prescott (1985) showed that with three key assumptions (1)
complete markets, (2) no trading frictions, and (3) time-additive utility, agents must be ex-
tremely risk-averse in order for the stochastic growth model to deliver the empirical average
excess return on stocks relative to bonds. This is the \equity-premium puzzle."24
24To account for historical US data, a risk aversion larger than, say, 50 would be required. In comparison,
micro estimates of risk aversion fall in the range 1{5, which is generally viewed as the \plausible" range.
35The key source of the puzzle is that °uctuations in aggregate consumption growth in the
model are too small. Relaxing the assumption of full insurance against individual income risk
appears promising because it will generate large °uctuations in individual consumption growth,
while leaving aggregate consumption growth una®ected.
Suppose, ¯rst, that individual heterogeneity and aggregate risk are independent. In this
case, individual risk turns out to be irrelevant for the price of aggregate risk (Mankiw 1986;
Telmer 1993; Heaton and Lucas 1996; Krusell and Smith 1997). Constantinides and Du±e
(1996) show this formally in an example with unit-root individual earnings risk, and Krueger
and Lustig (2006) extend this result to a more general set of income processes and trading
frictions.
Suppose now that idiosyncratic risk varies systematically with aggregate consumption.
Mankiw (1986) shows that when preferences exhibit a precautionary motive, the equity pre-
mium will increase if the dispersion in uninsurable earnings shocks is countercyclical. Focusing
on CRRA utility and unit-root earnings shocks, Constantinides and Du±e (1996) solve for the
equity premium in closed form, con¯rming Mankiw's result. Storesletten et al. (2007) calibrate
an overlapping generations model to quantify the magnitude of this e®ect. Using empirical
estimates of countercyclical income risk, they ¯nd that individual risk can account for up to
one-quarter of the empirical equity premium.25
An alternative mechanism for heterogeneity to in°uence asset prices is if aggregate risk is
concentrated in fewer hands. Clearly, if only a subset of the population hold risky assets, then
their consumption growth will be both volatile and highly correlated with the equity return.
Empirically, stock owners' consumption covaries more closely with the stock market than the
consumption of individuals who do not participate in equity markets (Attanasio et al. 2002;
Brav et al. 2002; Vissing-J¿rgensen 2002).26 This will increase the premium required (by the
stockholders) to continue to hold stocks.
To investigate the importance of this channel, Guvenen (2006) examines a heterogeneous
agents real business cycle model where a small minority of agents (20%) are allowed to hold
stocks, and where these investors have a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution (EIS). The
remaining agents can only save in a bond and have a lower EIS. Guvenen ¯nds that a plausibly
25Their model also replicates the fact that the share of ¯nancial wealth in stocks is increasing with age.
26Entrepreneurial risk|which due to ¯nancial frictions cannot be diversi¯ed in ¯nancial markets|is an
alternative channel by which aggregate risk is concentrated in fewer hands; see Heaton and Lucas (2000).
36calibrated version of this model can account remarkably well for both the equity premium and
a number of additional key ¯nancial statistics, such as the Sharpe ratio and the covariance
between the return on equity and the risk-free rate.
Due to a low EIS, the investors who are forced to hold bonds are more interested in smooth-
ing consumption. Hence, in recessions (booms) the non-stockholders want to reduce (accu-
mulate) wealth. This wealth must be picked up by the stockholders, further adding to the
pro-cyclical variation in their consumption growth, and therefore increasing the premium they
require to hold stocks.
The main critiques against explanations for the equity premium based on limited stock-
market participation are two. First, the implied concentration of aggregate risk on stockholders
is di±cult to detect empirically. Second, it would be preferable to endogenize non-participation.
In fact, it turns out that the non-participants in Guvenen's model would be willing to pay
substantial amounts to gain access to equity markets. Models with transaction costs to hold
stocks (as pioneered by Aiyagari and Gertler 1991) allow one to endogenize the participation
decision.27
In sum, a consensus seems to be emerging that incomplete markets and heterogeneity have
signi¯cant implications for asset pricing, but that these features alone cannot fully resolve the
equity premium puzzle (see, e.g., Kocherlakota 1996; Heaton and Lucas 2007).
6 Concluding remarks
Heterogeneous agent models have become the norm, rather than the exception, in macroeco-
nomics. They provide a useful synthesis between the macro approach to economic questions,
grounded in dynamic recursive equilibrium theory, and the micro approach focused on hetero-
geneity among individuals in their innate characteristics, their luck, and their choices.
Among heterogeneous-agent economies, the standard incomplete markets (SIM) model is
already a workhorse of quantitative macroeconomics. The ¯rst generation of SIM models took
a fairly narrow view of risk (only exogenous endowment shocks), of insurance (only saving), and
of the interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks (none). However, the greatest
27Along these lines, Gomes and Michaelides (2008) propose a life-cycle model where agents di®er in risk
aversion and EIS. Agents with a high EIS accumulate most of the wealth, and end up holding most of the
stocks. Consequently, aggregate risk is concentrated on them.
37strength of this framework has proven to be its °exibility. Macroeconomic research in the
past decade has demonstrated that the SIM model can be successfully extended in all three
directions.
Given the burgeoning literature, it would be di±cult to do justice to all contributions in this
area, and we have undoubtedly neglected lots of interesting work in this survey. Nevertheless,
we have tried to describe some of the important progress that has been made, and to highlight
some challenges on the horizon. We conclude by summarizing what we think are some of the
priorities for heterogeneous agent macroeconomics.
With respect to the sources of heterogeneity, macroeconomic models should be systemat-
ically extended to incorporate additional sources of risk in addition to individual labor pro-
ductivity shocks. In the same vein as the real business cycle literature, which, with time,
recognized the importance of additional sources of aggregate °uctuations beyond shocks to
total factor productivity, heterogeneous agent macroeconomics should come to terms with the
fact that some of the biggest risks in the lottery of life are connected to parental background,
health status, and family dynamics. Including additional relevant sources of heterogeneity will
make it possible to re¯ne our answers to existing quantitative questions, and will allow us to
evaluate a broader set of policy issues.
As to the channels of insurance, the SIM model should be developed to overcome two
important criticisms. First, from a theoretical perspective, the market structure is assumed
exogenously, hence the model is subject to a version of the Lucas critique: public policies have
a limited impact on private risk sharing. The most recent generation of SIM models takes
this critique more seriously and includes setups with endogenous borrowing limits, in the spirit
of the endogenous incomplete markets literature. Second, from an empirical perspective, the
baseline SIM model seems to o®er too few insurance possibilities relative to the data. More
work should be devoted to quantify the overall degree of insurance faced by households in
actual economies, and to include in models the most prominent channels of insurance in order
to close the gap with the data. Both these issues are key for policy questions, where the extent
of private insurance and the degree of crowding out between private and public insurance must
both be of the right size to deliver reliable answers.
Finally, future research should address more thoroughly the relationship between aggregate
and individual uncertainty. The view that the two sources of risk have, at most, a statistical
38correlation, but no deep common driving source is overly simplistic. We need economic micro-
foundations relating aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. There are good reasons to suppose that a
range of macroeconomic developments have implications for both aggregates and for dispersion.
Technological change and increased competition|perhaps resulting from increased openness to
trade|might increase both average productivity and simultaneously increase volatility and dis-
persion in individual earnings. Alternatively, in a world of asymmetric information, changes
in the relative quality of public versus private signals could move both means and variances:
Veldkamp (2007) surveys this nascent literature. Search and matching models o®er another
framework with a natural interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk: shocks to ag-
gregate productivity can, in principle, lead to waves of match creation and destruction. More
work needs to be done on integrating labor market frictions of this type into models with
risk-averse agents and incomplete markets.
These issues are important because a deeper theory of how aggregate and idiosyncratic
°uctuations are connected will allow us to go much further in understanding the extent to which
heterogeneity coupled with market incompleteness ampli¯es the e®ect of aggregate shocks, and
the extent to which aggregate shocks a®ect inequality.
The main motivation for developing a deeper theory of the interaction between aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk, however, is the same as for enriching our models of risk and of insurance: it
makes the framework much more useful for policy analysis. In particular, work in this direction
will take us closer to delivering on the promise held out by Lucas (2003). He points out that
this class of models can potentially be used to study, in a uni¯ed way, aggregate stabilization
policies that reduce output °uctuations, and social insurance policies that reallocate resources
among households. The key novelty is in the ability to evaluate the distributional impact of
aggregate stabilization policies, and the business cycle implications of social insurance policies.
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